



1000 things you always want to know about SSO but you never dare to ask

6th Control System Cyber-Security Workshop (CS)2/HEP

Luis Rodríguez Fernández

08/10/2017


Agenda

Why me?
SSO. Why?
SSO. How?
Conclusions



Agenda

Why me?



Why me?

<http://www.asturias.es>

Vignette portal suite

SSO solution: **Novell iChain**

Problem:

Information Architecture rules!

Login form embedded home page




iChain redirects to its on login page

User eXperience degraded!

Infinite discussions...

Lesson learned:

Check the specs first!



Why me?

JBoss Application Server



Different application context same cluster

ClusteredSingleSignOn

LDAP_Authenticator

Lesson learned:

Keep it simple



Why me?

Liferay Portal

Alfresco Content Management System

Mantis Bugtracker

Central Authentication Server

Lesson learned:

Opensource works!



Why me?

CERN Oracle WebLogic Applications

Built-in SAML2 module

Challenges:

Oracle Documentation

Oracle Support


Automate the setup

Legacy

Lesson learned:

Share your knowledge!

{ REST }




AIS Common login

Common login form with fields for 'Login Name or Email Address' and 'Password', a 'Login' button, and a red reminder: 'Reminder: you have agreed to comply with the CERN computing rules'.

CERN Single Sign-On

Sign in with a CERN account, a Federation account or a public service account

CERN Single Sign-On interface showing options to sign in with a CERN account, use credentials, one-click authentication (including Windows/Kerberos and Certificate), or a public service account (Facebook, Google, Live, etc.).



Why me?

Java Web Hosting Service aka MWOD

PaaS

Apache Tomcat as a Service

Stopped 04/10/2017


Replace by openshift

Shibboleth

Used by many other CERN IT Services

Lesson learned:

Trust your IT!



SSO. Why?



SSO. Why?

Benefit for the end **users**:


Only one password to rule them all

Benefit for your **organization** security:

Lower risk of phishing

Benefit for your **developers**:

Delegate authentication implementation



SECURITY is not complete without  <http://cern.ch/ComputerSecurity>

Protect your passwords
Protégez vos mots de passe



A cybercriminal, who knows your password, will abuse your computing account
Un cybercriminel, qui connaît votre mot de passe, abusera de votre compte informatique



SSO. Why?

Web User Interfaces for control systems at CERN

WinCC_OA SCADA (BE-IC)

Apache Tomcat



Websockets

CERN SSO

MARS explorer

PLC barcode scanner

Pique system EN-ICS



SSO. How?



SSO. How?

CERN Identity Management Architecture

User registered in Oracle Database

Member of groups and mailing lists

Owner of computing resources

Microsoft Active Directory


Authentication Providers

Kerberos

LDAP

SOAP

SSO




SSO. How?

CERN SSO. SAML2

Assertion:

“This is Luis, his email is lurodrig@cern.ch, he has been authenticated via the login form and he works in the building 31”



SSO. How?

Oracle WebLogic as SP

SAML2 out-of-the-shelve

Custom

WlsAttributeMapper:

Java Principals

SAML2SLO: logout

ssoFilters: apps integration

Legacy

Oracle APEX

Configuration

EntityID + Certificate + Endpoints


IdP register

Circle of trust

Oracle Database

User session

APPLICATION ID: application_1
SAML2 ENDPOINT: https://myapplication.cern.ch/weblogic_cluster_a/saml2



SSO. How?

Shibboleth as SP

Opensource

Shibboleth daemon

Memcached

User session


Apache httpd server

mod_shib

Assertion data in


HTTP: headers

AJP: attributes



SSO. How?

SAML2 Web Profile HTTP-POST Redirect Binding



SSO. How?

OAuth2 in a nutshell

Security Framework for Authorization

Access tokens + HTTPS

Actors. Examples:

Resource owner: end user

Resource server: API

Client: web site consuming API

Authorization server:

Grants access with owner approval



SSO. How?

OAuth2. The valet parking analogy

Car → protected resource

Car owner → resource owner

Car owner → authorization server

Parking attendant → client

Valet key → access token



SSO. How?

Oracle REST Data Services

Java Web module

Translates HTTP verbs into SQL transactions

GET /employee → SELECT * FROM employee...

PUT /employee → INSERT INTO employee (...)

DELETE /employee/32 → DELETE FROM...

OAUTH2 supported

<https://test-mwod-examples.web.cern.ch/oaut2-ords-client/printsites>

<https://oraweb.cern.ch/ords/devdb11/lurodrig/site>



SSO. How?

CERN OAUTH2. Authorization Service


Authorization server

Resource server: user data (json)

Client credentials grant

Machine-to-machine

Applications work as clients



Conclusions



Conclusions

Lessons learned

Check specifications

Test, test, test!!!

Keep it simple

Opensource works

Share your knowledge

Do not reinvent the wheel!

Trust your IT

Follow standards

Different scenarios

Web interfaces

SAML2 Web profile

APIs



OAUTH2

HOW STANDARDS PROLIFERATE:
(SEE: A/C CHARGERS, CHARACTER ENCODINGS, INSTANT MESSAGING, ETC)



Conclusions

Demo: Thursday 12th October, 17:45 - 18:15
THSH302 - 1000 Things....





QUESTIONS?

luis.rodriguez.fernandez@cern.ch

References

Oracle Weblogic as a Service Provider for CERN Web Applications

<http://openlab.cern/publications/presentations/weblogic-service-provider-cern-web-applications-apex-java-ee>

Oracle Weblogic CERN SSO integration packages

<https://github.com/cerndb/wls-cern-ss0>

Oracle Weblogic SAML2 Authorization

<https://db-blog.web.cern.ch/blog/luis-rodriguez-fernandez/2015-02-oracle-weblogic-saml2-authorization>

SSO with WebLogic 10.3.1 and SAML2

<http://biemond.blogspot.com.es/2009/09/sso-with-weblogic-1031-and-saml2.html>

ForgeRock OpenAM

<https://github.com/ForgeRock/openam-community-edition>

<https://backstage.forgerock.com/docs/openam/11>

Spring security SAML2

<https://docs.spring.io/spring-security-saml/docs/1.0.0.RELEASE/reference/html/chapter-quick-start.html>

<https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security-saml>

Security Assertion Markup Language V2.0 Technical Overview

<http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-cd-02.html>

CERN SSO and Shibboleth

<https://linux.web.cern.ch/linux/scientific6/docs/shibboleth.shtml>

The OAUTH 2.0 Authorization Framework

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749>

OAUTH 2.0 in a nutshell – Simple Oriented Architecture

<http://www.simpleorientedarchitecture.com/oauth-2-0-in-a-nutshell/>

Developing Oracle RESTful Services

<https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/DB/DevelopingOracleRestfulServices>

Oracle JET, ORDS & OAUTH2

<https://db-blog.web.cern.ch/blog/luis-rodriguez-fernandez/2017-04-oracle-jet-ords-oauth2>

CONTACTS

ALBERTO DI MEGLIO

CERN openlab Head
alberto.di.meglio@cern.ch

MARIA GIRONE

CERN openlab CTO
maria.girone@cern.ch

FONS RADEMAKERS

CERN openlab CRO
fons.rademakers@cern.ch

ANDREW PURCELL

CERN openlab Communications Officer
andrew.purcell@cern.ch

KRISTINA GUNNE

CERN openlab Administration/Finance Officer
kristina.gunne@cern.ch



www.cern.ch/openlab